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The American Public’s Reaction to the Japanese American
Internment
NICHOLAS TAYLOR∗
The American public voices its concerns over fundamental issues, like the justice system, that pertain to the US
Constitution. The American public in World War II, however, faced many challenges in voicing its concerns over the
Japanese American internment due to the dominance of racism at the time. This paper explores the background of
Executive Order 9066, the document that provoked mass evacuation, in order to understand why President Franklin D.
Roosevelt enforced it and why most people, particularly on the West Coast, advocated for Japanese American evacuation.
More fundamentally, the bulk of the paper centers on the argument that different individuals and groups broke their
silence on the matter. They reminded other people of the importance of democracy during wartime as it applied to every
Japanese American citizen as well as Japanese immigrants who were trying to achieve the American Dream.
When people attending school or visiting historic sites today first begin to learn about the Japanese
American internment, it is obvious that they view the evacuation as morally wrong. However, the
way that Americans during World War II viewed the Japanese American internment was divisive.
A poll from the American Institute of Public Opinion in March 1942 shows that 93 percent of
Americans were in favor of the removal of Japanese immigrants and 59 percent supported the
removal of Japanese American citizens. Only 1 percent opposed the internment of Japanese
immigrants, while 25 percent opposed the internment of Japanese American citizens.1 While
most Americans did not generally recognize Japanese American citizens and aliens as ordinary
people, others from the 1 percent and the 25 percent shed some light on the truth of the situation
involving the evacuees. Those people, who were well ahead of their time, believed that the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt did not enact Executive Order 9066 because of “military
necessity,” as they called it. In fact, they believed it was the public’s overall lack of acceptance of
Japanese Americans that caused the government to evacuate the entire Japanese population on
the West Coast while they disregarded the facts.
The reality was that many Caucasian Americans grievously had mistreated people of Japanese
descent before evacuation, which is at odds with the fact that this set of individuals clearly did not
pose a threat or do any harm to the country domestically. This is especially true compared to
German immigrants, who actually posed a threat to national security with the rise of the German
American Bund, a pro-Nazi organization of around 40,000 people of German descent.2 Still,
even before the Japanese military bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the government
was skeptical of the loyalty of Japanese Americans.3 In the fall of 1941, the Alien Divisions of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a list of alien groups,
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including West Coast Japanese, who, they believed, could threaten national security.4 They
proposed that they should place them in internment camps if the US went to war with their
ancestral countries.5 Journalist John Franklin Carter put together an intelligence unit of the Office
of Strategic Services, which is now the Central Intelligence Agency, to investigate the loyalty of
aliens in the United States.6
Carter reported businessman Curtis L. Munson’s findings about the Japanese Americans to
President Franklin Roosevelt.7 According to Munson, an “overwhelming” majority of the Nikkei
were loyal to the United States and they had no intention to harm the country.8 Additionally, US
Naval Intelligence Officer Kenneth D. Ringle, who was fluent in the Japanese language, clarified
that more than 90 percent of the Nisei, the second generation of Japanese Americans, and 75
percent of the Issei, the first generation of Japanese immigrants, had no loyalty to the country
of Japan.9 Ringle eventually went on to disagree with the Japanese American evacuation once
FDR signed Executive Order 9066. He argued that “there was never a shred of evidence found of
sabotage, subversive acts, spying, or fifth column activity on the part of the Nisei or long-time
local residents” following his “careful investigations on both the West Coast and Hawaii.”10
Munson and Ringle’s findings provided real evidence regarding the Japanese Americans’ overall
behavior towards the United States.
Despite factual evidence that the majority of Japanese Americans did not commit any sabotage
on the West Coast, there were still problems that remained in the minds of government officials
that were eventually passed on to the American public. Similar to how some Americans are
currently dealing with the coronavirus pandemic, one major factor led to the decision to relocate
Japanese Americans to internment camps, and that was hysteria. As the Japanese bombed Pearl
Harbor and America entered the war, Americans became extremely worried. However, it was not
until the spread of “fake news” from US Army Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander
of the Western Defense Command, that Americans incomprehensibly put the blame on Japanese
Americans.11 DeWitt expressed anti-Japanese sentiments by stating “a Jap is a Jap. It makes no
difference whether he is an American citizen or not. I don’t want any of them.”12 In a phone call
with US Army Major Karl Bendetsen on January 24, 1942, DeWitt said he believed that Japanese
Americans corresponded with the Japanese Navy to commence the Pearl Harbor attack.13 He,
therefore, proposed the evacuation of Japanese Americans due to his own belief that Japanese
Americans posed a security threat to the United States.14 Without any legitimate information,
DeWitt’s belief undoubtedly sparked public hysteria amongst West Coast residents as well as
government officials.15 Unsurprisingly, historians question DeWitt’s judgement and his ignorance
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an analyst or careful thinker who sought balanced judgements of the risks before him,” and he
“did little to calm the fears of West Coast people.”16
Informed by DeWitt’s lies to the public, many Americans believed his words rather than
fact-checking him as people often do today with politicians and military leaders. Among the
majority of Americans who were extremely averse to hosting Japanese citizens, Earl Warren, then
Attorney General of California, defended DeWitt’s proposal. Warren argued that the fact that
there were no incidents before the attack on Pearl Harbor meant that Americans were “being
lulled into a false sense of security” and that “our day of reckoning is bound to come.”17 This was
obviously a sign of hysteria and hatred towards Japanese Americans in the United States.
DeWitt’s proposal caught the attention of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who not
only advocated for Japanese American evacuation, but also was responsible for carrying out the
executive order following its approval. Roosevelt told Stimson to “be as reasonable as you can”
when carrying out the evacuation.18 Like DeWitt, Stimson ignored the real facts. He, especially,
did not listen to the concerns of his top military advisors from the Army and Navy Departments,
for they believed that “there was no possibility of invasion [of the West Coast]” by the Japanese,
and it was not necessary to carry out evacuation orders.19
Members of FDR’s staff were not entirely in favor of Japanese American removal. US Attorney
General Francis Biddle and FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover both expressed concerns regarding the
evacuation.20 Biddle, as with the entire Justice Department, did not find the evacuation to be
necessary. He wrote a memorandum to FDR on February 17, 1942, regarding his concerns for the
California economy as well as the behavior of West Coast residents. While he reluctantly agreed
that the War Department was to carry out evacuation orders for the soon-to-be evacuees, Biddle
argued that the evacuation “would materially disrupt agricultural production in which they play a
large part” and that “the farm labor” was “so limited that they could not be quickly replaced.”21
He also added that “it is extremely dangerous for the columnists. . . to suggest that an attack on
the West Coast and planned sabotage is imminent when the military authorities and the FBI have
indicated that this is not fact.”22 Hoover backed Biddle’s argument, saying that “the necessity for
mass evacuation is based primarily upon public and political pressure than on factual data.”23
Despite warnings from Hoover and Biddle, Roosevelt did not heed their advice, and portions of
the public soon began to question the government’s handling of the evacuation.
Indeed, FDR was under pressure when he made the decision to evacuate thousands of
Japanese Americans, both citizens and aliens alike. The advice he received from his cabinet
and other executive officials was “conflicting.”24 While he was not reluctant to approve the
unethical executive order, he was not resolute either. He understood the ramifications that the
evacuation order would have on Japanese residents and the question about the constitutionality of
the issue, but he never considered civil rights as the primary concern for America at the time.25
Unquestionably, Roosevelt focused more on the war effort above everything else. According to
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FDR scholar Greg Robinson, Roosevelt’s approval of the evacuation order was a “failure” that
proved to be “a lack of compassion, or more precisely, of empathy” and that his decision “was not
of malice but indifference.”26
FDR’s approval of the evacuation order was, indeed, a failure, and at least part of the public
was profoundly disappointed in his decision. On February 19, 1942, “another day that will live in
infamy” in the minds of Japanese Americans, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066. This order gave Secretary of War Henry Stimson the authority to establish military areas
on the West Coast and remove 120,000 people of Japanese descent from those districts.27 About
60 percent of the affected people were those of the Nisei generation, the first Japanese Americans
born in the United States whose Fourteenth Amendment rights the government violated.28 While
the public opinion poll from March 1942 seems to suggest that a majority of Americans supported
the evacuation, there were groups and individuals who opposed the order.
Indeed, a vast majority of West Coast residents were in favor of Japanese removal given
their anti-Japanese sentiments and the fact that they wanted to segregate from Japanese residents.
There were also some competing white farmers who hoped to profit by buying their property at
fire-sale prices. Their response to Roosevelt’s executive order was filled with praise and relief
when West Coast newspapers announced the relocation of Japanese Americans.29 Many groups
on the West Coast, such as the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Western Growers
Protection Association, believed that the removal would lead to the reduction of economic
competition between Japanese and white residents.30 This belief, however, contradicts Biddle’s
above argument that the evacuation was going to cause a labor shortage, as Japanese American
farmers were assets to the agricultural economy in California.
From the perspectives of many evacuation supporters, the executive order did not completely
fulfill their expectations. On May 9, 1942, Lawrence Davies, a columnist for the New York Times,
had mixed views on the evacuation. He reported an incident in the Salinas Valley where the US
military temporarily settled Japanese Americans into an assembly center near white residents’
houses before they shipped them to permanent camps. One Salinas Valley resident, who felt that
the government was going back on its word, shouted in anguish, “Why do they have to put the Japs
right here? We thought we were going to get rid of them for good; now we find they’re bringing
them in from other places and dumping them on us.”31 He believed that so long as the evacuation
was done humanely, democracy was “not inert” in retaining the rights of Japanese Americans.32
Despite the obvious wrongdoing of the US military by unconstitutionally relocating thousands of
Japanese residents from the West Coast, Davies’s argument indicates that Japan’s view of the
US’s handling of the Nikkei was meant to be different than the US’s view of Germany’s handling
of the Jews in Europe.
Besides the New York Times, other newspapers across the United States reacted to the executive
order as representing a defense of democracy rather than the government’s mistreatment of
citizens. On February 21, 1942, two days after FDR signed the executive order, the Washington
Post carried a story with the subtitle “Nisei Reaffirm Their Loyalty.” The article briefly stated that
a group of Nisei women gathered to sign a pledge of their loyalty to the United States and that
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they devoted themselves and their “all-out energy to defeat Japan and the Axis.”33 The article
suggested to the public that the Japanese Americans were just as loyal and supportive of the war
effort as other Americans, which indicated that the order to evacuate them from the West Coast
was not the answer.
Other columnists continued to raise issues with the Japanese American evacuation. Ernest L.
Lindley, a columnist for the Richmond Times-Dispatch in Richmond, Virginia, also had mixed
thoughts. While he agreed that the evacuation order was necessary for the sake of national
security, he added that it was “a confession of ignorance.”34 He argued that both the Nisei and
the Sansei, also known as third-generation Japanese Americans, “have been imbued with a real
sense of devotion to this country and its institutions.”35 This was yet another piece that showed
the public’s recognition that Japanese Americans were not terrorists, even if they believed the
evacuation was mandatory because of “military necessity.”
Despite the public’s mixed response to the Japanese American evacuation, many different
organizations and groups across the country took a more radical approach. However, one cannot
understand their progressive arguments without understanding the Japanese Americans’ own
reaction to the executive order. To many Japanese Americans during that time, the news of the
executive order left them with shock and devastation. Take, for example, Star Trek actor George
Takei, a then five-year-old boy who remembers seeing the look in his mother’s eyes as they filled
with tears when the news of the executive order came to her. He stated, “I will never be able to
forget that scene. . . . [I]t is burned into my memory.”36 The conflicted emotions of Japanese
Americans like Takei’s mother justified their feelings of betrayal by the government and why
many Americans across the country were so eager to defend their civil liberties.
The poor conditions that existed in the relocation camps is critical to the response of both
Japanese Americans and those outside of that ethnic group. Upon move-in to the relocation
camps, many Japanese American evacuees lived in extremely poor conditions that caused further
uncertainty. When Takei and his family first evacuated along with thousands of evacuees, the
military forced them to sleep in horse stalls. Takei described the moment he and his family walked
into the horse stall: “As a kid, I couldn’t grasp the injustice of the situation.”37 To Takei’s parents,
who clearly remembered the circumstances of the camps, “it was a devastating blow. They had
worked so hard to buy a two-bedroom house and raise a family in Los Angeles. Now we were
crammed into a single, smelly horse stall. It was a degrading, humiliating, painful experience.”38
The inhospitable environments in which the camps were located also contributed to the
Japanese American sense of despair. Yuri Kochiyama, a Nisei woman, stated that the camps were
“in mountainous areas, deserts, and swamplands.”39 They were “not the nicest kinds of places for
family life” and they were “climatically. . . rougher than anything” that she experienced living
in California.40 Poor living conditions had a negative impact on interned Japanese Americans.
That negative impact motivated other minority groups and portions of the public to come to their
defense and remind people of the Japanese Americans’ rights under the Constitution.
33“Nisei Reaffirm Their Loyalty,” Washington Post, February 21, 1942, 4.
34Ernest L. Lindley, “On Capitol Hill,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 12, 1942, 11.
35Ibid.




39Yuri Kochiyama, Fishmerchant’s Daughter: An Oral History, Vol. 1 (Community Documentation Workshop, 1981),
14.
40Ibid.
Reaction to the Japanese American Internment 91
Despite their misgivings, most Japanese American residents followed through with the
executive order without any form of resistance. The Tolan Committee hearings, which directly
responded to FDR’s executive order, called on members of the Japanese American Citizens
League to testify, including its national secretary, Mike Masaoka.41 Although they were “willing
to prove loyalty by making sacrifices,” Masaoka expressed concerns of his own by arguing that
Japanese Americans “had every right to protest” despite the executive order’s intended purpose.42
The word “sacrifices” meant for Japanese Americans to voluntarily give up their homes and
follow the government’s orders to show their loyalty despite their First Amendment rights. Only a
few Japanese Americans made their own “sacrifices” to follow something they believed as more
superior than the executive order: the Constitution.
Most Japanese Americans did, indeed, respond to the executive order by acceding to it.43
However, there were a handful of them who felt strongly opposed to it to the point that they
courageously defied the order and voiced Japanese Americans’ need for full recognition as
residents of America. Gordon Hirabayashi, a then twenty-four-year-old Nisei student from the
University of Washington, was among the first to do so.44 Instead of getting away with a violation
he knew he committed, he appeared before the FBI office in Seattle and turned himself in to the
authorities willingly. Many newspapers across the country described him as a “conscientious
objector” for sacrificing himself for the Constitution.45 Hirabayashi used his Christian beliefs
as his motivation for objecting to the order. During that time, he wholeheartedly argued in his
defense:
Since childhood I have been in contact with the personality of Jesus. This personality
became more vivid, more real, and more meaningful with each significant experience.
If I were to register and cooperate under those circumstances, I would be giving
helpless consent to the denial of practically all the things which gives me incentive
to live. I must maintain my Christian principles. I consider it my duty to maintain
the democratic ideals for [which] this nation stands. Therefore, I must refuse this
order for evacuation.46
Whether they objected to the order or they simply went along with it, Japanese Americans were
not alone in defending their civil liberties. Many liberals, in particular, despised the internment.
Among many radical liberals who opposed the executive order was journalist Galen M. Fisher. He
described FDR’s reason for evacuation as a “blanket phrase” when the latter referred to “military
necessity.”47 In Fisher’s view, given the proven loyalty of most Japanese Americans, there was no
justification to remove them. The government’s action was illegitimate because they chose to
relieve the public from “fear of sabotage” rather than rely on actual facts.48 It was unfortunate,
yet unsurprising, that the West Coast residents under John DeWitt’s influence did not care about
factual information, but instead chose prejudice over acceptance of Japanese Americans.
Carey McWilliams, an author and journalist for the New Republic, was also an outspoken
advocate who, like Fisher, criticized the government’s actions. In his 1944 book, Prejudice, he
41“800 West Coast Japanese Go to Enemy Camps,” New York Times, February 24, 1942, 11.
42Ibid.
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46ACLU Press Service, “A.C.L.U to Test West Coast Evacuation Order,” June 1942, American Civil Liberties Union
Papers, 2356, Reel 203, Series 1, ACLU Subgroup 1, Roger Baldwin Years Microfilm 1912-50, Correspondence – Federal
Department, Princeton University Library Special Collections, Mudd Library, Princeton, NJ.
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described the Pearl Harbor attack as “an earthquake that sent tremors throughout the entire Pacific
Coast” and called Japanese Americans “the victims of this social earthquake.”49 The “earthquake”
that McWilliams referred to was the war hysteria among white Pacific Coast residents who
used Japanese Americans as scapegoats. Given his argument on the Pearl Harbor attack and its
relevance to the mistreatment of Japanese Americans, McWilliams felt that there were flaws in
FDR’s executive order. In a March 2, 1942, magazine article, he proposed a fair congressional
committee be established to investigate the evacuation in California, which he described as “a
complicated situation.”50 He was more afraid that the white West Coast residents “might go
berserk and mob the Japanese population” than of the Nikkei population itself if an enemy attack
took place there.51 Similar to Attorney General Biddle’s argument, he expressed concern about the
economic consequences of the internment. More specifically, he argued that a forced evacuation
of thousands of Japanese Americans, many of whom were farmers, would cause a disruption in
California’s surplus economy by decreasing the supply in the agricultural industry.52 Although he
believed that Californian farmers in 1942 would “face a close balance of supply and demand for
farm labor” for their own benefit, he argued that Japanese American farmers would face an even
harsher labor environment in the internment camps.53
If the moral efforts of progressive liberals like Galen Fisher and Carey McWilliams were not
strong enough, then Norman Thomas, a member of the Socialist Party of America, took an even
more radical stance. Not only did he agitate against the executive order, but also against those
who either wanted to compromise or were not radical enough in their opposition to evacuation. In
early March 1942, he described FDR’s executive order as “the worst plot” and “the establishment
of military despotism.”54 In this case, Thomas compared FDR’s controversial decision to Hitler’s
totalitarian power in Europe and his persecution of Jews because of their non-Aryan race. He also
accused the American Civil Liberties Union of being too soft in its opposition to the evacuation,
calling it a “dereliction of duty” to accept FDR’s executive order as being “within the proper
limits of the President’s war powers.”55 While reluctantly accepting the internment for what it was,
he co-led the Post-War World Council with pacifist Oswald Villard to entice hundreds of liberals
and socialists to join his organization in order to end the mistreatment of Japanese Americans in
internment camps.56 It was movements like Thomas’s Post-War World Council that attempted to
bring likeminded liberals and evacuation oppositionists together to address the veracity of the
executive order. Unfortunately, the public did not seem supportive to his cause.57
Despite Thomas’s opinion, the ACLU did, in fact, contest FDR’s executive order. The ACLU
played an essential role regarding the response to the Japanese American removal because its
sole mission was to protect the rights of individuals, including Japanese Americans, in order to
make the Constitution relevant.58 On March 6, 1942, ACLU President Roger Baldwin wrote
a letter to President Roosevelt out of concern that the evacuation order was “open to grave
question on constitutional grounds by depriving American citizens of their liberty and use of
49Carey McWilliams, Prejudice: Japanese Americans: Symbols of Racial Intolerance (Boston: Little Brown and Co.,
1944), 106.
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their property without due process of law.”59 Baldwin’s argument refers to the violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, both of which grant citizens the right
to due process, including the Japanese Americans born in the United States. He also believed
that the military’s authority to “remove vast populations from areas” that were “declared to be
defense zones” against the Japanese military was “unchecked.”60 If the government removed
Japanese residents from the so-called “defense zones” without regard to their constitutional rights,
it opened the door to other violations of civil liberties justified by the war.
In the same letter to FDR, Baldwin not only expressed the ACLU’s concerns, but he also
strongly suggested the President revise the executive order, acknowledging the Constitution’s role
and importance. As part of his proposal, he argued that loyal Nisei Americans should remain
on the West Coast and that the military should only evacuate them if there was proof that they
attempted sabotage.61 He believed that “considerations both of public policy and of law” made
it necessary that “the rights of these citizens which are equal with those of other American
citizens should be given every possible protection.”62 His letter was not enough for FDR to change
his mind on the matter immediately. Baldwin knew that FDR struggled to keep faith with the
Constitution and carry out the wishes of the majority of Americans.
Despite efforts to convince FDR to release Japanese Americans from the internment camps,
Baldwin went so far as to challenge the legality of the evacuation in court.63 Unfortunately, the
ACLU was often not successful in defending their cases of Japanese Americans who violated the
evacuation order. In the case of Gordon Hirabayashi, Baldwin arranged with Mary Farquharson
to be Hirabayashi’s attorney as Farquharson had worked with Quakers like Hirabayashi prior to
the case.64 Funding issues within the board, in addition to Baldwin’s continuing efforts to entice
FDR to revise the order, prevented them from immediately advancing forward.65
Despite trying to maintain liberty when the question of the Constitution and Japanese
Americans came to mind, Baldwin was stuck in the middle of a divided ACLU. Some ACLU
members, such as Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, and Arthur Garfield Hays, worked
with Baldwin to challenge the constitutionality of the executive order, while other members “were
blindly loyal to Roosevelt.”66 Among those who opposed the ACLU’s involvement, one member
compared the Japanese American internment to “a public health quarantine in measles.”67 This
shows that 1942 proved to be a challenging year for those like the ACLU and liberals outside their
organization who fought the Japanese American evacuation from the Pacific Coast.
Although Baldwin and many ACLU members ultimately accepted the evacuation, it does
not mean that they stopped believing in the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. In the
latter half of 1942, some senior members of the ACLU exchanged letters with Dillon S. Myer,
the head of the War Relocation Authority at the time, in which they discussed ways to reform
regulations in order to improve the treatment of evacuees. When a letter from Myer came to
them communicating that the military had, in fact, begun to release certain Japanese Americans
59Roger Baldwin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 18, 1942. American Civil Liberties Union Papers, 2356, Reel 203,
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from internment camps, the ACLU responded with satisfaction.68 The ACLU also expressed
gratitude in a sense that the military did not separate Nisei children from their immigrant parents
knowing that it could have caused significant outrage from internees.69 Although it took the
government almost four years to realize what the ACLU meant, the latter’s role in maintaining
the civil liberties of Japanese Americans ignited other organizations and minority groups to
challenge the executive order and the overall internment. To that extent, the ACLU helped voice
their concerns not just throughout 1942, but during the entire war as well.
Not only did political groups express their concerns about the executive order, but also
many Christian communities on the West Coast in accordance with their moral and pacifist
beliefs. When FDR enforced the executive order in February 1942, many Christians were worried
that the incarceration would affect America’s relationship with other countries, particularly the
ones in Asia. They felt that the internment “would irreparably damage foreign missions” and
that it would also ruin “America’s chance to establish global peace by destabilizing domestic
race relations and damaging diplomatic ties with Asian nations.”70 Although that may not have
been the case realistically, the internment could have given the United States a bad reputation.
This especially would have been true if the perception of other nations was that the treatment
of Japanese Americans was as bad as Adolf Hitler’s treatment of European Jews, which was
obviously different in reality.
Many Christian leaders on the West Coast also played a role in assisting the already-interned
JapaneseAmericans. Several of themmoved to Southern Idaho, where one of the internment camps
was located, to collaborate with Japanese Christian ministers and “maintain pastoral care.”71 Both
white and Japanese Christian leaders collaborated together to end the internment and integrate
the Nikkei into white church communities to “strengthen the integrity of American Christianity”
and “reduce national racial tensions.”72 Unfortunately, the goal to assimilate Japanese Americans
into white churches failed as many white and Nikkei congregants opposed their efforts.73 They
even went so far as to stop attending church services altogether.74 The government had already
betrayed the Nikkei, so it was understandable for them to refuse to congregate with white church
communities. Besides the war effort, the failed efforts of kindhearted Christians showed that
hatred and lack of acceptance of different racial groups dominated the American home front.
TheChristian Century, a religious magazine, also played a more radical role in their opposition
to the removal of Japanese Americans. Its editors posed fundamental questions about the Japanese
American removal in an effort to capture the public’s attention. Like the ACLU, the editors saw
internment as an infringement on democratic principles by the government. However, they also
pointed out Christian solutions. In an article the Christian Century published in June 1942, they
argued that the evacuation policy was “headed in the wrong direction” and that all churches should
take an active role “to guard against further injustice” to Japanese Americans.75 Furthermore, the
magazine added that FDR and others responsible for the evacuation order should be like men
68Roger N. Baldwin, Arthur Garfield Hays, and John Haynes Holmes to Dillon S. Myer. October 8, 1942. American
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who “declare their mistake as boldly and as widely as they declared their first faith.”76 None of
those men saw it that way.
Minority groups, more specifically African Americans and Jewish Americans, identified more
personally with the plight of Japanese Americans. Knowing about their negative feelings towards
the executive order, ACLU President Roger Baldwin argued that those groups had “a firm sense of
security that in fighting for the United States” they were “fighting for their own future security.”77
That was certainly the case for African Americans, who believed that democracy and the war
effort were equally important. The Chicago Defender, an African American newspaper, argued
that clearly the military interned Japanese Americans in internment camps for crimes they did not
commit, other than their appearance.78 From their perspective, the same as with other groups
that actually looked into the facts behind the evacuation, the interment was “the result of pure
racialism.”79
The news of what was happening to Japanese Americans in the internment camps raised
concerns for African American communities as they were afraid that they, too, might suffer the
same fate.80 George Schuyler, an African American writer for the Pittsburgh Courier, argued that
“it [would] be easy to denationalize millions of Afro-American citizens,” so in that case, he added
that “we must champion their cause as ours.”81 This was a strategy to unify African Americans
and other minorities to face the already undemocratic United States.82 Some anti-Japanese
groups adhered to the executive order so well because they aimed to deprive minorities of their
rights as well. Schuyler also believed that the Native Sons of the Golden West, whose extremely
fascist views were similar to the Ku Klux Klan and the German American Bund, aimed to
remove Japanese Americans from the West Coast. One such case was when they denied Japanese
Americans and other minority citizens access to vote, a violation of the First and Fifteenth
Amendments.83 To African Americans, unity with Japanese Americans was the key to achieve
equality in a society that routinely trampled on the rights of people of color.
African American communities, particularly those in Baltimore, also used their Christian
beliefs to argue against removal. Margaret Lewis, a black female editor of the newspaper the
Afro-American, argued in response to the internment, “The principles of our democracy is founded
– tolerance, liberty, the respecting of the human personality regardless of race, creed, or color,
even though not at all times observed – is the ideal. There could be nothing more Christian than
the ideal.”84 The “ideal” was a reminder that they, too, believed that nothing was more important
than the Constitution, a document that established the foundations of democracy. Lewis even
added that the terrible conditions in the camps that Japanese Americans endured was un-Christian.
She described them as “inadequate,” “crowded,” and “unbearable” during the summer months
due to the exhaustive heat.85 African Americans related the Japanese American experiences to
their own mistreatment by higher officials and violations of their political, social, and economic
rights.
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Although African Americans did receive some work benefits from the Fair Employment
Practice Committee in 1941, their treatment by whites was not significantly different from
Japanese Americans. In fact, some African Americans on the West Coast were even at risk of
following the same fate as Japanese Americans, even if the evacuation did not directly apply to
them. If a non-Japanese person was married to a Japanese person, then the former, too, faced
internment, especially if it was an African American or Hispanic spouse. Charles Williams, an
African American photographer for a local Los Angeles newspaper, nearly faced internment
because he married a Nisei woman.86 When the evacuation commenced, Williams and his wife
managed to do “the smart but perfectly legal thing” by escaping the West Coast and migrating to
Chicago, where they began a new life.87 While very few African American newspapers, such
as the New Journal and Guide based in Norfolk, Virginia, reported this incident, it was still
important news for African American communities. Charles Williams’s story justifies the reason
many African Americans cared for defending Japanese American rights. They praised Williams
for his bravery in helping himself and his wife leave the area without military supervision. If
anything, their escape for freedom from military authorities was almost comparable to when
Harriet Tubman led slaves to freedom on the Underground Railroad in the mid-nineteenth century.
African Americans were not the only minority group to voice their opinion against the
Japanese American internment. Jewish Americans on the West Coast also responded with
concern to the treatment of Japanese Americans. In fact, Jewish and Japanese Americans both
suffered from systematic racism, although it was possible for Jews to pass as gentiles. Similar to
African Americans, Jewish Americans identified with Asian Americans’ long-standing struggle
for equality. In the late 1930s, attacks on Jews increased, and well-known public officials like
Charles Lindbergh and Father Coughlin helped legitimize antisemitism in the United States.88
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, some Jews on the West Coast worried about the fate of
Japanese Americans. The day after the attack, two rabbis, Samuel Koch of Seattle, Washington,
and Irving Reichert of San Francisco, California, warned the public to not panic as they expressed
concerns with white West Coast residents’ bitter attention toward Japanese Americans.89 Koch
argued that “it is not unlikely that hotheads will endeavor to embarrass them in various ways”
despite the fact that Japanese Americans had no role “in the folly of Japan.”90 Reichert expressed
similar concerns, and he argued, “we must not commit the unpardonable offense of visiting upon
the heads of the innocent” and that “we Jews ought to be among the first to cry down the unjust
persecution of the foreign-born in our midst whose patriotism is equal to ours.”91 Reichert and
Koch’s arguments showed that Jewish leaders on the West Coast were wise enough to show
Americans that hysteria should not solve the problem with Japanese Americans and that they
assumed the latter group was affiliated with the enemy because of their appearance.
The Jewish press was also critical in combating racism towards Japanese Americans. As
historian Ellen M. Eisenberg argued, Jewish support and advocacy for equality were “staples” in
the Jewish press on the West Coast, something that the government did not seem to fully grasp.92
Scribe, a Jewish American newspaper in Portland, Oregon, reacted negatively to FDR’s executive
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order. It described supporters of the mass removal of Japanese Americans as “unthinking persons”
who “forget the basic concepts of freedom for which America fights.”93
The Jewish press of the Pacific Coast believed that the executive order was certainly an
unthinkable act and acknowledged it violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
However, unlike African Americans, Jewish Americans, as a whole, did not believe that fighting
for equal rights and fair treatment for Japanese Americans was just as important as supporting
the war effort. While the evacuation concerned Jewish Americans less in other parts of the
United States, West Coast Jews struggled balancing their contribution to the war effort and their
support for Japanese Americans’ rights.94 Therefore, they remained mostly silent because the
mass genocide that Hitler aimed toward their European counterparts prompted them to focus on
the war effort in Europe.95
Franklin Roosevelt’s executive order that led to the Japanese American internment received
more mixed reactions from the public than what the March 1942 poll shows. Most Americans
supported evacuation and felt relieved once it took place, while at least some important parts
of American society felt that it went against democracy, something that US soldiers overseas
fought for. Based on the arguments of those who opposed the evacuation, the internment had a
negative effect on Japanese Americans as the government ignored their civil liberties. Japanese
Americans and those who supported them during World War II knew the fundamental principles
of the Constitution. Because most Americans were in favor of the evacuation, those who opposed
it struggled to vocally address racism through protest. In today’s nation, racism continues to
shape government policy and the ideas and actions of some Americans. People in the United
States see the government separating Hispanic children from their families.96 They see other
people using racist sentiments towards those of Chinese descent because of the spread of the
coronavirus.97 It is obvious not all have learned from the mistakes that hysteria caused in World
War II. The question remains whether these mistakes of today will be allowed to stand again or if
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